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Comments
A GOVERNMENT OF JUDGES: AN HISTORICAL RE-VIEW
Michael H. Davis*
In 1921, Edouard Lambert, a professor of law at Lyon specializing in comparative studies and founder of an Institute of Comparative Law there, published a book, Le Gouvernement des juges et la
lutte contre la legislation sociale aux Etats-Unis,l thus singlehandedly creating the phrase, a "government of judges", 2 to denote a
truly unconstrained system of judicial review which could not be
limited even by constitutional amendment. The phrase quickly entered the parlance of French public law and even that of popular
culture, deriving much of its force, no doubt, from the historical
French aversion to a strong judiciary, eventually becoming a veritable "catch-phrase". 3 Over the past sixty-five years, it has acquired a
diversity of meanings ranging from, most broadly, any judicial constraint upon executive or legislative action, to, most narrowly, only
* Copyright, Michael H. Davis, 1986. Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio.
1. Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la ldgislation sociale aux EtatsUnis-L'exp~rience amdricaine du contrdle judiciaire de la constitutionnalitddes
lois (1921).
2. Lambert is credited by numerous writers with having introduced the phrase.
"The phrase... entered French political discourse with E. Lambert ...

."

Neuborne,

"Separation of Powers Review," 57 N. Y U. L. Rev. 363, 382 n. 67 (1982). The phrase,
and the various concepts it captures, reflects such a fundamental aspect of French
social as well as legal culture that it has been adopted by the popular vocabulary as a
shorthand way of evoking strong but ill-defined fears of judicial power. For instance,
a popular journal, reporting the death of an Israeli demonstrating against Defense
Minister Ariel Sharon after a judicial report found the Minister responsible for massacres in Lebanon, stated, "At the end of this tension between government by judges
and that by soldiers, a death occurred," Nouvel Observateur, No. 954, p. 20, 18-24
February 1983.
3. See infra, text accompanying n. 19; Beardsley, "Constitutional Review in
France," 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev. 189, 204. The historical French aversion to a strong judiciary is well-known, and it is classically traced to conditions under the Ancien Regime and its Parlements. For a treatment of the subject which more exactingly
identifies that aversion as one to judicial hierarchy, and specifically as an antipathy
to three analytically-separate hierarchical structures, see Davis, "The Law/Politics
Distinction, the French Conseil Constitutionnel, and The U.S. Supreme Court," 34
Am. J. Comp. L. 45 (1986).
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those judicial tribunals in which judges lack sufficient professional
training.
While perhaps unusual, having a central legal concept remain so
loosely defined is not unknown. An American parallel is the Rule of
Law. While a central concept, it remains largely undefined, ready to
be marshalled in support of a wide variety of legal and political arguments. Its meaning runs the gamut from, at its broadest, simple
peace and absence of illegality to, at its most narrow, the application
of precedent and stare decisis.4 It would, of course, be useful to
know exactly what it means when it is used. The same is true of the
French concept represented by the phrase, "a government of
judges". And, as it turns out, the diversity of meanings is not so mysterious at all. As this article will show, most of the meanings were a
part, though not the whole, of Lambert's original argument. To define the phrase, different writers at different times have chosen different parts of the phrase's underlying argument as a response to
what appeared to be the contemporary threat. Thus, the historical
context tended to dictate the phrase's definition. To make matters
worse, some English-speaking writers have used the phrase in apparent ignorance of its shifting meanings.
Ironically, the phrase itself has gained currency seemingly commensurately with the decline of the book's availability. It is now out
of print and virtually unavailable both here 5 and abroad. But though
the book is unavailable, the apparently undefined phrase it bore represents such a central French concept that it is important to understand exactly what it is that the French (or we) are saying when
they use (or we borrow) the phrase, and it would be interesting to
know why it has acquired such a diversity of meanings.
A careful review of the literature reveals not just the meanings
which have been attributed to the phrase but also a relationship,
though only a rough and imperfect one, between historical developments in French legal culture and the changing meanings of the
phrase. Those meanings developed contextually, paralleling developments in French legal history. In France that history includes the
eventual fall of the Third Republic, the entire Vichy regime and
Fourth Republic, and the first quarter-century of the Fifth; in
4. There is a fundamental distinction between "a" rule of law and "the" Rule of
Law. "A" rule of law simply signifies a particular legal doctrine such as a narrow
ruling of the NLRB with respect to labor law. See Williamson, "Labor 'Bean Count'
Skews Reagan NLRB's Record," Legal Times, p. 14, 18 Nov. 1985. "The" Rule of
Law, on the other hand, has the diversity of meanings indicated in the text above.
5. There was only one edition published and it has never been translated. The
RLIN and OCLC bibliographic utilities and the National Union Catalogue indicate
that less than two dozen libraries in the United States possess a copy. An Englishlanguage chapter summary, hereinafter referred to as Summary, has been prepared
by this author, and is on file with this journal.
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America, it extends from before the "Nine Old Men" whom
Roosevelt tried to control through his court-packing plan, through
the entire period of the Warren Court's liberalism, to the implementation of the Burger Court's reactionism. It is the development of
the phrase within that historical context that is examined below.
A few words of caution. To observe a contextual shift of meaning in the phrase should not suggest that those changes are due to
some immanent character of the phrase itself. Any conclusion based
on my observations must be far more modest. What is observed is
the natural tendency of people to alter their definitions in response
to a changing environment, certainly not the other way around.
I. THE BOOK
The book is relatively straightforward, its argument supported
with a rather wide range of references to then-contemporary developments in American constitutional law.6 Its point of departure,
however, was a development observed starting at around 1880 at
which time, Lambert claimed, judicial review shifted from mere regulation of separated public powers to judgments about the propriety
of legislation. He described the Court's resistance to social legislation, notably workmen's compensation laws, labor legislation, such
as that involved in the Lochner case,7 and the anti-labor construction
of the antitrust laws. Lambert attributed this extension of American
judicial review to the unconstrained breadth of common law generally and the American view that constitutional law was simply another species of common law.
Lambert claimed that two developments, one substantive, the
other procedural, were crucial to the expansion of American judicial
review. The first was the view that due process had an enforceable
substantive component, resulting in the broad construction of rights
to liberty, property, and contracts. Second, he wrote, American techniques of statutory construction were equally important, substituting
the court's judgment for that of Congress. These two observations
were supported by reference to cases and demonstrable doctrinal developments. One effect of broad judicial review, according to Lambert, was a legislative impotence which led to legislative inactivity.
Not only does that lead to increased judicial power, Lambert
claimed, but it creates public distrust of and hostility towards the judiciary. His most crucial and dramatic claim, however, was an undemonstrable extension of his evidence: he predicted that through
the techniques of common law judging, statutory construction, and a
6. For a more complete review of the book's contents, see the Summary, supra
n. 5.
7. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 49 L.Ed. 937, 25 S.Ct. 539 (1905).
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substantive jurisprudence which elevated individualism above social
values, judicial review could and would extend to nullification of
constitutional amendments designed to limit judicial review.
To Lambert, the menace, if there was any, was that threat of judicial review of constitutional amendments. The possibility that the
judiciary could control economic, social, and political growth without
recourse would be threatening to any free society. It is in that sense,
and only in that sense, that Lambert wrote of a "government" of
judges, with the assumption that ultimate responsibility and control
would lie in the judicial branch. And it was only in the fear of this
threat, his extrapolation that judicial review could-and would inevitably-lead to ultimate judicial domination that one could speak of
a judicially governed society.
Lambert concluded that such a situation was not just due to
American conditions but also due to the inevitably conservative and
ambitious nature of law and the legal profession. Thus, the same developments were possible in France if judicial review were implemented since the legal profession was essentially similar and
constitutional materials, such as the Declaration of Rights of 1789,
were potentially susceptible to substantive readings at least as broad
as analogous American sources. He admitted that, as a result of this
increased judicial activism, Americans had a more effective judicial
protection of individual liberties but claimed that was due as much
to history as to legal science. His conclusion was surprisingly, even
laughably, modest. He suggested that French libraries collect American case materials to complement the statutory materials already
available. Without such case materials, said Lambert, French scholars would have an incomplete and misleading view of the American
legal system.
And so Lambert's book was not particularly controversial and
was received accordingly without a stir. In fact, even today there is
little with which one would seriously take issue. Except for some
minor errors (in reality, nothing more than speculation),8 the only
major mistake is Lambert's claim that the Court was immune to
control by constitutional amendment. As an error, it was one with
which all comparatists can sympathize. Just as Americans are
tempted to conclude that Continental law, distinctive for its use of
code sources, is judicially inflexible, so too did Lambert apparently
conclude that American law, distinctive for its use of judicial common law, must inevitably be legislatively and even constitutionally
impotent.
It is undoubtedly the fears that mistake may have evoked that
explains the book's eventual association with various controversies.
8. See Summary, supra n. 5.
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In fact, Lambert's prediction that judicial review could extend to the
propriety of constitutional amendment was treated by at least one
reviewer as the reality. And it was the threat of that possibility that
apparently caught the French imagination. As that early commentator said, such a development in France would lead to "stupefaction".9 But such a stupefying threat never materialized and, as will
be seen below, the phrase was employed to combat much lesser
ones.
II.
A.

THE CONTEXTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHRASE

Initial Reactions

Initial reactions were balanced and mild. Reviewers understood
that Lambert intended a relatively objective and non- judgmental
study.
We have to choose and, at the same time, decide in
favor of a traditional politics or an innovative one. The
great value of a book such as Lambert's is that it facilitates
this choice by clearly teaching us the results which have
been achieved after a certain period of judicial control in
the only major country so far which has totally adopted it.10
A book note characterized the book as "an excellent study".'1
Although "the dangers of the American system are displayed with
great care", it said, the book was "only an objective discussion and
2
neither attempts to support nor to oppose any particular solution.'
A later, more comprehensive, book review was entirely favorable
but, again, completely dispassionate. It admitted, as had the earlier
book note, that Lambert advocated no particular position, while suggesting, however, that Lambert's preferences were not entirely disguised. On the whole, the view seems to have been that Lambert's
was a helpful view of American developments from which French
law could usefully profit. There was hardly a hint that the book or
its theme was in any way controversial. At most, one could conclude
that the book sounded a note of caution but surely not so much as to
constitute a warning. In fact, in a quite ambivalent way, the choice
was presented not as between good and evil, nor as between right
and wrong, but instead, as between two political "tendencies",
between
on one hand the conservative, traditional tendency, and, on
the other hand, I don't say the progressive tendency (for if
9.
10.
11.
12.

Infra n.14.
Le Fur, "Summaries and Reviews," 29 R.D.P. 306, 314 (1922).
"Bulletin Bibliographique," 28 R.D.P. 445 (1921).
Id.
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it were a matter of certain progress, the question would not
exist), but the tendency for change, the attachment to
13
novelty.
However, it is noteworthy that the first review read Lambert's
14
possibility of uncontrollable judicial review to be a fait accompli.
Further, that review noted an underlying bias beneath Lambert's
neutrality, saying, "he declines to take a position, although it is easy
to see the direction that he favors." 15
Moreover, the phrase did not seem to these reviewers to symbolize simple judicial review, but something both more broad and
more narrow: the involvement of the judiciary in social policies, in
economic policies, and in the "quarrels and passions of the electoral
battle". 16 It must be remembered that this was occurring in the middle of the Third Republic, a time when judicial review was, although
an occasional subject of discussion, nevertheless just theoretical and
even, perhaps, only academic. At the time, judicial review was certainly not an important or divisive issue and what supporters it had
17
were politically diverse.
Ironically, but perhaps significantly, the most important article
about European judicial review following the appearance of Lambert's book ignored it completely.' 8 Written by Hans Kelsen and appearing in an influential French review, the author, citing the
example of the Austrian Supreme Court of which he was Reporter,
energetically supported the notion of judicial review. Kelsen's disre13. Le Fur, supra n. 10 at 313.
14. Id. at 310:
[N]ot only has the judicial power been shown too powerful already for
its powers to be effectively limited, but it is possible that it will be called to
extend them even more....
... This is in the matter of judicial control, not just of law, but of
amendments to the constitution, even the federal constitution. That is in
fact the obstacle brought, in the name of the constitution, to a constitutional
amendment disfavored by the judges. Such a claim would plunge our legislators and our jurists into stupefaction. In the United States it is supported
by important figures and prestigious law reviews. Recently, after the 18th
amendment to the federal constitution was passed prohibiting the consumption of alcohol, an appeal before the Supreme Court was brought by the liquor companies. This appeal was rejected, but for formal and procedural not
substantive, reasons; the Court said nothing that would bar the possibility of
acting, if need be, in a similar case.
15. Id. at 310.
16. Id. at 311.
17. Id. at 312:
It is because it is very logical that it has been recognized in France by so many
people belonging to very different parties, from radicals or christian publicists to the
progressives and partisans of new democracy.
18. Kelsen, "La Garantie Juridictionnelle de la Constitution," 45 R. Dr.Pub. 197
(1928).
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gard of Lambert's work is surprising, especially since Lambert's
work has been described as
an analysis of.. .judicial review... which made the.. .threat
of "government by judges" a menace (and a catch-phrase)
to which every proponent of constitutional review in any
form had therefore to respond. 19
It seems remarkable that Kelsen, certainly familiar with American constitutional law, and probably also with Lambert's book,
treated so sanguinely and without directly mentioning Lambert, the
objections which Lambert posed. Without once using the phrase
"government of judges", nor any element of the American experience, Kelsen was direct but brief. Addressing virtually all of Lambert's points, but far from finding that judicial review threatened a
"government of judges", he saw in judicial review the ultimate rule
of law.
Though Kelsen, like Lambert, thought it would be unacceptable
were a Supreme Court to annul constitutional provisions or revisions, he, unlike Lambert, did not think that the notion of judicial
review implied any such threat. He did think, though, that the use
by a constitutional tribunal of general vague equitable principles,
such as justice or equality, would encroach upon legislative competence. Such an event would, it can be supposed, have been thought a
government of judges by Kelsen. The important difference, however, is that, despite the then recent appearance of Lambert's book,
Kelsen did not think that what it predicted was in any way the inevitable result of a system of judicial review. The worst that judicial
review threatened, to Kelsen, and which might therefore constitute
a government of judges, was unnecessarily politicized tribunals.
B.

Third Republic

It was not long before the phrase started to develop its own
gloss, being applied to situations far beyond Lambert's more modest
intentions. One of the earliest of these was in a note to Vincent, a
Conseil d'Etat proceeding. 20 In that case, the plaintiff had contested
the constitutionality of legislation granting, or more accurately, delegating, legislative powers to the prime minister. He also questioned
the constitutionality of self-styled "laws" decreed in accord with that
parliamentary delegation, as well as the intra-ministerial regulations
(arrete)issued under them. The Conseil refused to extend its review
to such executive action, just as it had never acknowledged a power
19. Beardsley, supra n. 3 at 204.
20. Vincent, S. 1945, III, 53-54 (note Charlier).
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to review the constitutionality of true parliamentary legislation. The
partially disapproving note, by Charlier, stated:
Classical case law guides the judge, in specifying the limits
of his powers of examination, to officially provide a criterion of law to each constitutional period; our case supplies
therefore the jurisprudential solution to this question which
has been discussed in the last years and which remains of
considerable practical interest so long as the laws of the
"Vichy" remain "provisionally in force" by means of the ordinance of 9 August 1944: how does one recognize law in the
"Vichy" system? ... It requires and it is enough that there
is a decree issued by the chief of state in his counsel of ministers or by the chief of government in counsel of cabinet
and that this decree contain the formula: "The present decree will be issued as a law of the State". Thus law is the
work of the executive power, not of Parliament. It in no
way issues, not even indirectly, from the people. The entire
argument of the impossibility of control based upon the sovereignty of the popular will thus collapses. And the essence
of the traditional textual arguments also, for the word law
which appears in those former laws prohibiting control,
centered upon an act having a democratic significance.
The exclusion of this control can no longer, therefore,
be based upon anything other than the fear of a "government by judges", or, more precisely, of "legislation by
judges", a fear ultimately leading to, technically, a limitation of the role of the reviewing judge, and an interpretation of prior laws in light of that limitation: it is no longer
the object of the control that one considers, it is the possible
21
controller.
Used in this way, the phrase has a more general and ambiguous
sense than Lambert intended. Through it, Charlier evoked the overt
politicization of judicial activity which might accompany judicial review of one of the other governmental branches. Such an interpretation was necessary, however, because the dispute did not concern
the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation, but, rather, of executive activity. In other words, the term was adapted to fit the historical context.
What was the significance then, to Charlier, of the phrase "government of judges"? He termed it a "fear" and implied that it was
irrational, illogical and even, perhaps, unrealistic. But it signified
more than the ultimately unreviewable actions of a judiciary run
amok, as had been Lambert's use of the phrase. The fear was not
21. Id.
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that the Conseil would be beyond ultimate control, but that it would
review something-law-which had traditionally been considered
unreviewable. 22 This first noteworthy use in French jurisprudence,
after Lambert, of the phrase "government by judges", used it in the
sense of a political involvement of the judiciary, something far short
of, but thus more expansive than, the political immunity against
which Lambert cautioned. In fact, Charlier understood this expansiveness, for he concluded his argument by noting, "one must be
careful that this argument.. .risks to go too far: pushed to the extreme it condemns all creative case law!" 23
The reason for this perversion of original intent is simply understood. The threat in Vincent was not the unconstrained judicial
review examined by Lambert; to be useful, the term had to be
adapted to the quite different contemporary threat of simply
broader judicial latitude. This evolution introduces much later use of
the phrase. It is undeniable that Lambert had mentioned the use of
substantive due process review-essentially the "fear" of Vincent.
But to Lambert that had been only one of the symptoms of the more
profound threat of a judiciary which, exercising such review, would
constitute a "government" immune to any further control rather
than just one feature of a democracy. It is as if Lambert had not really created an argument, but simply supplied a device which could,
and did, fulfill a pre-existing need. A carefully tempered argument
fell to a long tradition of French history which would, and did, seize
upon any opportunity to keep the judiciary subordinate, at any expense. In summary, the mature Third Republic view narrowed the
earlier focus upon politicization of the judiciary down to only one of
its components: the use by such tribunals of substantive due process
review.
C. Fourth Republic
There was another change in the phrase and its subject during
22. Id:
Let us specify what this fear signifies. There is in the State a division of labor, and if an authority is charged with making law, it is unwise if another
intervenes in this activity. But this idea should give way in the case where it
is alleged that the authority charged with this activity accomplishes it
wrongly and itself exceeds the limits of its division of labor in doing something else than what it is supposed to, and where the authority which intervenes only does so to return the first to the limits of its charge. To judge the
legislator is not more to legislate than to judge commerce is to do that, nor
than to judge crimes is to commit them! The real reason for the exclusion of
this control is fundamentally, therefore, that it can be abusively detoured
from its mission and to permit those who exercise it to substitute for or
combine themselves with the legislators to elaborate rules according to
what seems to them right and desirable.
23. Id.
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the short-lived Fourth Republic. In 1950, Roger Pinto published an
article 24 examining American law. He addressed the New Deal developments, including F.D.R.'s eventually successful restructuring of
the court, all of which he claimed demonstrated the demise of the
phrase's underlying concept. 25 There was no way that Pinto, in 1950,
could foresee the developments of the Warren Court and, in an unintended illustration of the hazards of political-legal forecasting, he
cited the "mediocrity" 26 of Truman's nominations of Burton, Vinson
and Clark, as evidence of the consolidation of the "disappearance of
the left wing" of the Court. Pinto assured his readers that those
nominations and the supposed right turn of the Court "will without
in the future, this mission" of
doubt permit [Truman] to accomplish,
27
activism.
judicial
controlling
More important, Pinto's definition of the phrase was far more
unself-conscious. He seems to have equated it simply with a particular kind of judicial activism, and especially, with a specially
politicized judiciary. Pinto did not suggest that the New Deal Court
would have seized the kind of power that Lambert intended by the
phrase, that of invalidating constitutional amendments, nor even
that mentioned by Charlier: broadly substantive due process review.
The issue, as Pinto correctly interpreted it, was the Court's narrow
attachment to conservative economic theories in the face of the New
Deal's liberal approach. Though that was certainly a part of Lainbert's thesis, it was not sufficient to define it.
It is crucial to observe, then, that by the time of the Fourth Republic with its unfortunately ineffective Constitutional Committee
(a product of the clearly insufficient constitutional guarantees of the
Third), the simple legitimacy of a constitutional tribunal was no
longer at issue. Instead, the fear the phrase triggered was not that of
the tribunal itself, but of its excesses. To Pinto a government of
judges referred to the "political role", or "political power" 28 of the
U.S. Supreme Court-prior to Roosevelt, at least-operating under
what he called the "myth" of judicial neutrality. A government of
judges was not threatened, according to Pinto, when constitutional
judges exercised a political role, which he saw as inevitable, but only
when they were insensitive to that role. One can see this, in a way,
as a development initiated by Kelsen, furthered by the post-war recognition of the dangers of unbridled legislative supremacy, and ma24. Pinto, "The End of the Government of Judges," 66 R. Dr. Pub. 833 (1950).
25. A dramatic conflict arose between Franklin ]D. Roosevelt and the
Supreme Court. It would put an end to the government of judges.
Pinto, supra n. 24 at 837.
26. Id. at 842.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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tured within the experiences of the abortive Fourth Republic. But
note that judicial insensitivity, too, was only one of the components
of Lambert's original argument.
Although Pinto briefly echoed Lambert, observing that "the essence of the government of judges was to give to the judiciary... the
last word, ' 29 he stressed that American judicial review had become
reduced and simplified so that the "value judgments" which constitutional tribunals inevitably render somehow did not constitute such
a "last word". By refusing to treat "economic liberalism as constitutional law", Pinto claimed, the Supreme Court avoided such a result.
Pinto seems to have confused, or at least merged, substantive due
process review with final, unconstrained, review. In other words, the
last word was not so much in the structure of judicial review itself,
which remained 30 but in its political application. That is, the evil of
the judicial last word was not due to the word being last but to the
breadth of the word employed. Pinto had, in a way, turned Lambert
on his head. In summary, Pinto accepted judicial review and even
activism, but not when identified with a particular, reactionary, economic view.
The second major exploration of this theme was by Jean
Rivero. 31 Writing in response to Pinto's article, Rivero noted that
while America was witnessing the death of its earlier government of
judges, France was ironically breeding its own. The evil of a government of judges, said Rivero, as had Kelsen in portions of his article,
lay in its acceptance into positive law of unwritten constitutional
dogma. Rivero's targets were the "general principles of law", which
the Conseil d'Etat had applied to French administrative law (there
being no clear constitutional limits on the administration). The ability to "define and maintain a national ideology, and to preserve, by
respecting it, the ethical foundations of the unity of the State, '32 allowed the Conseil to threaten, as did the Supreme Court, a government of judges. And, in an argument strangely reminiscent of
Lambert's discussion of the Supreme Court, even the inability to
override the legislature, which deprived the Conseil of the "last
word", only appeared crucial, because the Conseil had declared the
general principles of law to be "supra-legislative". 33 Interpretation of
laws could allow the general principles to pervert statutes meant to
restrict the Conseil and narrow readings of others could make mere
29. Id. at 844.
30. "Plus qa change, plus c'est la meme chose," quipped Pinto, claiming to quote
an American, C. H. Pritchett. Id.
31. Rivero, "Le juge administratif francais: un juge qui gouverne?" R. Dalloz
Chronique VI 6 (1951).
32. Id. at 22.
33. Id. at 23.
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exceptions out of legislation intended to override so-called general
principles.
Rivero's argument was made at a time when the Comite constitutionnel, a Fourth Republic development meant to conduct some,
but only the most minimal, constitutional review, was not allowed to
apply substantive standards, written or unwritten, in its deliberations.34 Thus, although it was inaccurate for Rivero to define a government of judges as the use of unwritten principles in
constitutional review, it was consistent with the contemporary his35
torical context.
D.

Fifth Republic

It is significant that the abuse of the phrase undoubtedly
reached its high point around the time of the enactment of the 1958
Constitution. It was in part the creation of the Conseil constitutionnel that fueled much dispute and it is not surprising that the phrase
was used in its broadest and least defensible sense during debate
over the Conseil. Many debates over the Conseil constitutionnel derive, however unfairly, from Lambert's book and many features of
the Conseil exist because of a fear of a "government of judges". In
fact, there are specific provisions in the Constitution which respond
to each and every one of the concerns expressed in Lambert's Le
gouvernement des juges. Thus, George Bermann's claim that "constitutional review by the Conseil constitutionnel ... does not open the
way to a gouvernement des juges" is paradoxical because to read the
1958 Constitution is almost to conclude that its Framers used Lam36
bert's work as a mode d'emploi.
The point during the drafting of the 1958 Constitution at which
the phrase was explicitly employed is revealing. The Constitution, as
originally proposed, only authorized review of legislation by the
Conseil constitutionnel when initiated by the President, the Prime
Minister, or the president of either of the two parliamentary assem34. See infra n. 46, however, for Rivero's later, somewhat revised views of what
constitutes a government of judges, at least with respect to the Conseil constitutionnel, as opposed to the Conseil d'Etat.
35. In an illustration of how we comparatists are frequently simply wrong about
jurisdictions which must always remain partly foreign to us [See Favoreu, Rapport
Gdniral Introductf, Cours Constitutionnelles Europienes et Droits Fondamentaux
26-27 (1982) and Davis, supra n. 3 at 88], Bermann has rioted the irony that the
French think only the American model of judicial review but not its French variant,
administrative review, can threaten a government of judges. Bermann, "Comment,"
27 Am. J. Comp. L. 583, 584-585 (1979). However, Bermann's claim is at odds with
Rivero's twenty-five-year-old article.
36. For a discussion of the various means employed to prevent the Conseil from
becoming a judicial body, see Davis, supra n. 3. Those means are, of course, traceable
to historical fears dating back to the Ancien Regime in which the Parlements oppressively exercised both legislative and judicial powers. See supra n. 3.
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blies. But during the debates an amendment was offered which
would have allowed such review when sought by a third of either assembly, and it was that amendment which most provoked use of the
phrase.
One of the members of the Constitutional Consultative Committee suggested that this would lead to anarchy, giving to "everybody"
the power of initiating review before the Conseil, which would effectively become, then, a government of "retirees". The Government
representative (the Guard de Sceaux), too, agreed that the amendment could lead to a "government of judges" (but insisted that, in
any event, they would not be retirees, since de Gaulle intended to
appoint "active people"). Another Committee member, opposing the
amendment, said that "a true constitutional court" would be synonymous with a government of judges. The author of the amendment
(M. Triboulet), however, insisted that his measure only assured that
an otherwise unresponsive system would offer relief to "aggrieved"
parties, and therefore the proposal simply occupied a position somewhere between an ineffective tribunal and a "government of
judges". 37 The amendment was adopted by the Committee but this
was one of the many suggestions which were not accepted by the
Government in its eventual final proposed form.38 Interestingly,
however, it was almost exactly this amendment which, fifteen years
later, was added to the Constitution. Many explain that this is due to
the fact that the ensuing years had allowed the French to become
accustomed to and comfortable with the Conseil before allowing it
such expanded power. It seems that in the same way as the proposed
change (and perhaps even the notion of judicial review) lost its terrifying effect, so too has the phrase gradually lost its impact. The debates over the 1958 Constitution seem to represent the high point in
the use of the phrase in its broadest and most threatening sense.
Since then, the phrase has encountered a more modern and knowledgeable reception.
In fact this change in the public consciousness, "a change of attitude over the traditional interpretation in France regarding Constitutional elements and declarations," is acknowledged in the remarks
made twenty-four years later by the Commissaire du Government
about his earlier role in the constitutional debates.39 He stated that
the Constitution of 1958 intentionally was silent as to the legal effect
of the document's Preamble and the Rights of Man, because to do
37. Travaux PreparatoiresDe La Constitution,Avis et Debats Du Comite ConsultatifConstitutionnel 75-76, La Documentation Francaise (1960).
38. See Beardsley, "The Constitutional Council and Constitutional Liberties in
France," 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 431, 440-441 (1972).
39. Janot, in Cours Constitutionnelles Europenes et Droits Fondamentaux 212
(1982).
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otherwise "would have incited an important number of people to
think that there was something that could have appeared to be a
'government of judges' ",.40 Although the committee members in the
1950s could hardly have dreamed that such individual rights could
ever be interpreted as binding, Janot, speaking in 1982 of that very
this as progress that
development, observed, "one [must] consider
''41
must be continued with wisdom (sagesse).
Contemporary debate over French judicial review has concentrated to a large extent over the membership of the Conseil constitutionnel. It is thus unsurprising that at least one contemporary
Fifth Republic writer has defined the phrase in terms of the judges'
personal predilections. 42 Perhaps because many of the developments
against which the phrase has been raised have become reality, a government of judges, according to Chiroux, depends upon the personalities, intentions, and institutional freedom, of those judges. Aside
from occasional diatribes in the popular media, apparently the simple existence of a constitutional tribunal no longer merits the
phrase's use.
According to Chiroux, a government of judges arises, as it did
for Pinto, when a constitutional tribunal has "the last word" vis-avis the legislature. But what constitutes that last word is not the
simple existence of such a tribunal, nor even the availability of unwritten principles as positive law. The last word is threatened when
the members of a tribunal are inclined to use it as such. Limited
powers and well-defined jurisdictions are constraints which prevent
a constitutional tribunal from becoming a government of judges, or a
Supreme Court.43 Thus, according to Chiroux, the 1974 amendments,
stopping short of "autosaisine",which would have truly threatened
a government of judges, were a useful advance for constitutionalism
without threatening such a government. The reform, Chiroux said
44
approvingly, was "good, but.. .modest".
Chiroux also praised the Conseil constitutionnel for its moderation and political sensitivity. Its refusal to participate in "'law making power' ", due in large measure to the Conseil's consciousness of
its low level of prestige, according to Chiroux, helps prevent it from
deteriorating into a government of judges. 45 As long as the tribunal
is composed of such judges, he says, neither a Supreme Court nor a
government of judges can occur. While Chiroux seems favorably dis40. Id.
41. Id. at 213.
42. Chiroux, "Libre propos sur le Conseil Constitutionnel: Le Spectre du Government des Juges?," 868 Revue Politique & Parlementaire15 (1977).

43. Id. at 16.
44. Id. at 26.
45. Id. at 26.
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posed towards a Supreme Court which would protect such abstract
values as constitutional democracy, and more concrete ones such as
individual liberties, he concludes that the "specter" of a government
of judges will prevent such a Court from developing in the near future. Possibly because a government of judges, in his eyes, was one
in which the judges were unqualified or at least unequal to their
task, he suggested transitional measures which would increase the
prestige of the members of the Conseil.
An article written by Rivero twenty-five years after his earlier
one may be an even more dramatic example of contextual meaning.
For in 1975, Rivero, who had earlier defined the phrase to be the use
of economic theory as constitutional law, wrote that the Conseil had
been able to avoid becoming a government of judges by the exercise
of its "prudence", in taking "modest" steps (reminiscent of the same
words used by Chiroux), and by employing objectively ambiguous
constitutional language as a limit on its own competence. In this article, Rivero asserted what constitutes a government of judges is
"the substitution for the will of Parliament the will of an irresponsible group finding its own options in the elastic body of constitutional
formulas ....-46 This later discussion by Rivero of "irresponsible"
members occurred at a time when one of the chief targets of critics
of judicial review, and of the Conseil constitutionnel, was the allegedly political nature of the Conseil's membership.
E. Specter and Catchword
If the beginning of the Fifth Republic represents the high point
in the phrase's abuse, it may reflect a growing maturity among
French legal scholars that much, though not all, recent use of the
phrase since then seems self-consciously exaggerated. Today, the
phrase is most frequently employed to demonstrate inappropriate
reactions by others to modern notions of constitutional control, implying that opponents of judicial review are reacting in an irrational
and inappropriate manner. A popular textbook in France illustrates
this, suggesting that the phrase evokes nothing more than a conditioned response to historical, but not contemporary, threats to democracy. According to its author, the phrase inappropriately denotes
any judicial limits on absolute legislative or executive power, by unfairly employing the emotional reaction to the abuses of the Ancien
Regime.47 This, of course, is an implicit recognition that earlier use
46. Rivero, "Judges Who Wish Not to Govern," in Le Conseil Constitutionnelet
Les Libertds 54 (1984) (originally a note appearing in Actualiti Juridique,droit administratif134 (1975)).

47. When we speak today, in a slightly pejorative sense, of a "Government
of judges," it is in reference to the time when the judiciary desired to play
the role of a counterweight designed to limit royal absolutism.
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of the phrase was a distortion. American authors, though, have been
48
slower to note this modernization.
Contemporary French writers have also shown a more conscious
recognition of the changing sense and earlier misuse of the phrase.
For instance, analyzing the Supreme Court decision in .N.S. v.
Chadha,49 which found the "legislative veto" unconstitutional, a
Congressional attempt to assert the power to review Executive regulations, one French author observed that very few members of Congress thought the Court had "just given in to the temptation of a
Government of judges." The use of the phrase seems partly sarcastic
(the author immediately added, "For the most part, however, the
prevailing notion was that congress had not suffered a true defeat."),
especially since it equated the phrase with any, if even a minor or at
least remediable, limit on Congressional power and because the author ascribed the phrase to an obviously minority position.5 0
This recognition that the phrase has what might be called a sarcastic contemporary utility is mirrored in a recent comment by
Favoreu in which he observes that the equation of the phrase with
the Supreme Court is due only to a mythical, unthinking, tradition.
For once, in France we will not turn, in matters of constitutional law, towards the American model, but towards
the European model. There is, in effect, a well observed tradition in our constitutional jurisprudence which is to refer
to the American Supreme Court, incarnation of all the virtues but also symbol of the famous danger or risk of the
"Government of Judges." Since Lambert's book, in effect,
the obligatory and quasi-exclusive reference to the
"Supreme Court" has become a part of our constitutional
mythology, alongside other received ideas: the American
system is a good one but that system is dangerous because it
51
leads to a "Government of judges.1
Consistent with this modern attitude is Luchaire's knowledgeable claim that the phrase can include any and all constitutional lim52
its in order to evoke "hostility to any control of constitutionality".
Perrot, Institutions Judiciaires26 (1983).
48. Thus, Neuborne has said the phrase is a symbol of any "substantive judicial
review". Though he fails to signal the changing nature of the phrase's meaning, he
usefully explains its relation to the unique French legal and political experience. On
the other hand, he does not identify at what point in French history the phrase had
the expansive interpretation he adopts. Neuborne, "Separation of Powers Review,"
57 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 363, 382 (1982).
49. 462 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983).
50. Luc Rouban, "L'Inconstitutionnalit6 du Veto Legislatif Aux Etats-Unis: Bouleversement ou Reequilibrage des Pouvoirs?," 100 R Dr. Pub. 949, 968 (1984).
51. Favoreu, supra n. 35 at 26.
52. Luchaire, Le Conseil Constitutionnel1 (1980).
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He treats constitutional control as a necessary evil of modern bureaucratic democracies in which popular sovereignty is increasingly
smothered. He has recognized that "the specter of a Government of
Judges will certainly be waved", 53 against his recommendation that
the Conseil constitutionnel be made more judicial by increasing the
number of jurist members.5 4 Luchaire's use of the phrase is in its
broadest, and thus least believable, interpretation. His implied recognition that such broad use of the phrase, far from creating contemporary fears, simply unmasks unreasonable opposition, demonstrates
the phrase's contextual relevance to a modern France in which "judicial review", or at least judicial constitutional control-as practiced
by both the Conseil constitutionneland the Conseil d'Etat-hasbeen
found not threatening and even acceptable.
Today, in France, it seems widely, though not unanimously, recognized that the term is nothing more than a crude synonym- perhaps with only sarcastic utility-for what Favoreu has termed, "an
actor in the political arena", 55 or, as one much earlier author put it,
"a mine field protecting property and the individual against the government's common Program. '56 This is so whether or not Lambert
originally intended it to be so, and whether or not French or English-speaking authors recognize the crudeness or blatantly political
nature of the definition.5 7 Were it not for the fact that this use of
the phrase is recognized to be myth-based, such a broader meaning
might evidence much broader fears exposed by developments which
must have seemed to Lambert purely and permanently academic.
But instead, any persistently serious use of the term by a few in the
face of that more general recognition reveals far more, I suspect,
about the despair that those few might feel at the obvious changes in
French public law during the last sixty years.
Some English-speaking writers have also noted the phrase's
53. Id. at 406.
54. Id. at 402. He concludes, however:
[A] comparative study of constitutional law in the various western countries
recognizing the principle of the primacy of constitutional norms would show
that our Republic is, among those countries, the one which grants the least
power to its constitutional judges. Now if there is one country which, by tradition, must demonstrate respect for liberty and law, it is certainly France.
Id. at 406.
55. Favoreu, "Le Conseil constitutionnel et l'alternance," 34 RF.S.P. 1002, 1003
(1984).
56. Luchaire, "Le Conseil constitutionnel et la protection des droits et libert~s
des citoyens," Mdlanges Waline, Paris, LGDJ, vol. 2, at 573 (1974).
57. Favoreu, for one, obviously recognizes the inaccuracy; in fact he has said, apparently somewhat hopefully, that the French are becoming too sophisticated to use
facile and inaccurate comparisons between the Conseil and the U.S. Supreme Court,
aided by reference to the "mythology" of a Government of judges, when the more
accurate comparison is to the other European constitutional tribunals. Favoreu,
supra n. 35 at 26-27.
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overbreadth. These writers have readily observed that the phrase
has acquired in France a "traditional" rather than a technical meaning, one that simply connotes increased political importance.58
George Bermann has been even more cautious, noting that the
phrase cries out for definition. It seems to be Bermann's conclusion
that the myth of a government of judges is only a threat to the
French when judicial activities intrude into areas which are inappro59
priate by virtue of history, tradition, expertise, or competence.
Thus, review of administrative matters is accepted in France because
the Conseil d'Etat has a long history and tradition of doing so
whereas such review might be provocative here in the United States.
Similarly, judicial review of legislation is not foreign to Americans
whose federal judges frequently have personal knowledge of legislation and of political activities. French judges, being professional judicial bureaucrats, have no such expertise or competence.
Recently, especially in the summer of 1986, public use of the
phrase quickened, 60 as "l'alternance" of 1981-the Socialist capture
of the government for the first time since 1958, and with it, of substantial nomination power over the theretofore uninterruptedly
rightist Constitutional Council-developed into "la cohabitation" of
1986-the unprecedented phenomenon of a Socialist President and a
rightist government. Rightist, and some centrist and leftist, newspaper headlines trumpeted the claim of some politicians that the
Council's curb upon some proposals of the new rightist majority con61
stituted a threat to democracy, and of a government of judges.
It seems surprisingly late in the constitutional day for such use
of the phrase and it is difficult to reconcile with the advances made
in recent French constitutional law. But if one proceeds from the
headlines to the text, one notes that the criticism was not aimed, as
the headlines would have implied, at the simple interference by the
Council with the immediate and complete implementation of the
58. The committee which drew up the first draft of the constitution in 1958
had proposed that recourse should be open to one third of the members of
either House, but the Government of the day, realizing that this would
greatly increase the political importance of the Conseil, and responding to
the traditional fear of "government of judges", had adamantly opposed it.
Nicholas, "Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review in France," Part II, 1978 Pub. L.
155; citing Favoreu, "Le Conseil constitutionnel regulateur de l'activite des pouvoirs
publics," 83 R. Dr. Pub. 1967, 5, 97.
59. Bermann, supra n. 35 at 584-585.

60. See, for instance, Kajman, "Le conseil constitutionnel estime que la nouvelle
loi sur la presse ne garantit pas le respect du pluralisme," Le Monde, p. 5, 31 July
1986; Fontaine, "Pluralisme," Le Monde, p. 6-7, 1 August 1986; Societ6, Le Monde, p.
6, 9 August 1986; Portelli "La partitocratie triomphante," Le Monde, 29 August 1986.

61. "J.J. Queyranne (PS): 'Non au Gouvernment des Juges'" La Croix, 9 November 1984; Duhamel, "Le parlement des juges," Le Monde, 19 July 1986; "Le Conseil constitutionnel, guardien de la Constitution ou gouvernment des juges?" Le

Quotidien, 17 October 1986.
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majority's projects. In fact, the comments were notable for two factors: first, there was virtually unanimous agreement that the existence of the Council was necessary and important to a modern
democracy, and did not alone constitute the forbidden government
of judges 62 ; second, the criticisms were specifically directed at the
Council's reasoning and its use of principles that did not explicitly
appear in the Constitution. The predominant demand was simply
that the Council should limit itself to the Constitution's "table de
6 3
lois", that is, its explicit mandates.
Most notable in the censure was an approach remarkably similar to that found in American legal criticism. Just as critics of such
decisions as Roe v. Wade, for instance, challenge what they perceive
to be illegitimate judicial legislation, the French critics, with their
reference to the "Tablets of the Law", insist that the Council should
be confined to the literal text of their Constitution.6 4 It seems that,
at least by the summer of 1986, what constitutes a government of
judges is similar to that found unacceptable by discontented Americans as well: the exercise of something akin to "substantive due process". Within such a specific critique, however, is the implicit
acceptance of the principle of constitutional adjudication as legitimate, necessary, and even democratic. This is rather amazing within
the context of French constitutional law and its development in less
than thirty years is or should be encouraging to its supporters. It
seems quite obvious that the phrase does not today connote what it
did more than half a century ago. If, as the most recent debates suggest, the phrase is now limited to the particular method of legal reasoning we call substantive due process, then the phrase has no
distinctively French sense. It no longer implies that the French generally reject constitutional adjudication.
However, while most modern French authors and some Englishspeaking ones have thus abandoned their formerly crude use of the
phrase, it is perhaps not altogether surprising that many American
62. E.g., the Garde des Sceaux, Albin Chalandon, Minister of Justice in Chirac's
rightist government, admitted that "There are no problems today even if each time a

law is enacted, the first question that arises is to know whether it will pass the Constitutional Council. . . . I have suggested self discipline by the Council itself. Le
Monde, p. 7, October 1986. The Left as well, who were once its most vocal critics now
are sanguine about the reality of constitutional adjudication, and criticize not its
existence but its direction. "The Constitution of 1958, by creating constitutional contral in the image of other great western democracies, was a step towards the Rule of
Law. But the erosion to which we are now witness is dangerous. It could carry us
towards a government of judges."

Jean-Jack Queyranne, National Secretary, Social-

ist Party, in La Croix, 9 November 1984.
63. "Instead of relying upon the Tablets of the Law, being the Given Commandments, the Constitutional Council relies instead upon general principles. By this, it
has a discretionary power." Albin Chalandon, Garde de Sceaux, Minister of Justice,
Le Monde, p.6, 9 August 1986. See, also, "Le Figaro," 18 October 1986.
64. Supra n. 63.
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authors nevertheless maintain the ambiguous sense of the phrase
and with it a particular American view of French public law. Thus,
several recent American writers persist in equating the phrase with
judicial review. 65 Not only that, but, in Canada the phrase has been
used in discussing, of all things, English review of administrative decisions! 66 If the French have modernized their use of the phrase because of a growing comfort with the notion of enlarged
constitutional control, some American writers cannot seem to accept
or at least recognize that development. It seems ironic, in fact, that
many Americans insist on remaining attached to an outdated view of
French constitutional law as something slightly quaint.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Initial reviews of Lambert's book and its thesis treated it as a
call to reasoned consideration; but soon some French writers began
to use the phrase as a call to arms, as a warning against any consideration of reforms far less threatening than those that Lambert addressed. Why this reception changed is entirely speculative.
However, the underlying facts are not. The observations Lambert
made were actually, though perhaps not intended to be, preliminary.
He described a dynamic, rather than static, situation. Even as Lambert wrote there was movement away from the doctrines he observed; the very precedents upon which change would be based were
being decided as he wrote. Thus, his observations could justifiably
only be treated as tentative and perhaps Lambert intended no more.
To be useful to later writers in need of a slogan, however, the phrase
could not be hedged by caveats and distinctions. Sloganeers therefore have used the phrase in a partial manner-to attack selectively
one of the many objects of Lambert's argument-without taking the
time (and thus losing impact) to qualify the citation.
What is especially marked in the contrast between Lambert's
own position, as well as its initial reception, and those who later employed it to their own ends is the basis for their arguments. It is
striking that to Lambert and his contemporary readers the choice
between a government of judges and one of legislators was not a
principled one, not a functional one, not even an institutional one; it
was, rather, a prudential one. In fact, the choice was essentially be65. Neuborne, supra n. 48 at 382. Beardsley, supra n. 3 at 204-06, 256. The most
recent use of the phrase by an American seems to be in Keeler, "Confrontations
juridico-politiques: le Conseil constitutionnel face au Government socialiste compar6
A la Cour supreme face au New Deal," 35 Pouvoirs 133, 134, 146 (1985) (also published in French Politics and Society, October 1985).
66. Brown & McNicoll, "Le juge: censeur de l'Action de l'Administration," 25
Cahiers de Droit 451, 451, 460-1 (1984). This is perhaps not all that strange. It is nothing less than Rivero's 1951 argument transported to Canada and England.
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tween two personality types. It was not dominated by a law/politics
distinction but by a lawyer/politician one. One might even say that it
was a choice between law schools and political science departments.
It was a choice between tradition and change, between conservatives
and progressives. As the first published book note observed, the
choice dramatized by Lambert's work did not involve political institutions but simply professional training.
The decisive question is therefore this: from which milieu should those who will exercise supreme control in a
country be chosen, what should their social training be?
Should they be exclusively jurists, or politicians? Because
there is a marked difference between them. A traditionalist
bent is much more prominent for the former than for the
67
latter.
And it may be the subsequent historical context, and its lack of any
reasonable probability that judicial review along American lines
could develop, that explains the later different reactions.
Once again, a note of caution. If the meaning of the phrase has
been altered, that must be due to French, and perhaps even American, constitutional developments. To think that the phrase, or Lambert himself, had the power or foresight to effect such changes on
their own is to claim an exaggerated importance for authors and
their words which it ill-behooves us to do.
I could conclude, similar to Lambert,68 that the reason his
phrase was abused is simply that his book, like the dearth of case
materials he bemoaned, is unavailable. But surely scholars on both
sides of the Atlantic, even if they have not had enough materials to
satisfy their wants, have had more than enough sense to avoid the
utterly crude abuse the phrase has suffered. It was not a failure to
read, but a failure to consider and reflect. Even de Gaulle, surely no
constitutional scholar, recognized the difference between the threat
of a government of judges and the Conseil constitutionnel.69 There
will be and always has been a long way to go, an unlikely way, in
France and the United States, before that threat becomes worthy of
concern. It may be speculative to wonder whether the phrase's history makes any difference. But of all the speculations, the one with
the most concrete consequences is whether, at the time the 1958
Constitution was being drafted, a more explicit comprehension of
the phrase and a more knowledgeable understanding of its history
could have avoided the use (and abuse) of the phrase to limit, per67. LeFur, supra n. 10 at 313.
68. See Summary, supra n. 5.
69. Charles de Gaulle, Press Conference, 31 January 1964, documents d'dtudesDroit Constitutionnel et Institutions Politiques 31-32 (George Burdeau, ed. 1976).
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haps unduly, the powers of the Conseil constitutionnel.Whether the
kind of academic license demonstrated by the history of the phrase
is thus responsible for stunting twenty years of French constitutional history is certainly worth pondering.
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